“Cases arising out of adolescent relationships often place courts at the uncomfortable intersection of human reality and statutory command.”
The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the recent decision in Prince Kumar Sharma and Others vs. The State NCT Of Delhi and Anr., CRL.M.C. 7145/2025/2025 & CRL.M.As. 30024-30025/2025 decided on 14.11.2025, refusing to quash FIR No. 696/2023 registered under Section 376 IPC, Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Sections 9–10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, is one such illustration.
At first glance, the facts evoke sympathy: a young couple living together as a family, a child born from the relationship, and the victim herself — now a major — unequivocally stating before the Court that she does not wish to prosecute her husband. The instinctive question, even for a seasoned lawyer, is:
If the relationship has stabilised into a family, the child has been born, and the victim herself does not seek to criminalise the man, why not quash the FIR?
The present proceedings arose from a domestic violence helpline call made to number 181, which was recorded as DD No. 36A at Police Station Bhalswa Dairy, Delhi. During the inquiry conducted on the basis of this call, the police discovered that Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 were residing together and projecting themselves as husband and wife. They claimed to have solemnised their marriage on 1 March 2023 with the consent of their respective families.
In view of the circumstances, Respondent No. 2 was produced before the Child Welfare Committee, which directed verification of her age and further investigation in accordance with law. Upon verification, her date of birth was found to be 2 October 2006, making her approximately 16 years and 5 months old at the time of the alleged marriage and commencement of the sexual relationship.
During the course of investigation, the statement of Respondent No. 2 was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In her statement, she made no allegation of sexual assault, coercion, or violence against Petitioner No. 1 and categorically expressed her unwillingness to pursue any criminal proceedings. A medical examination further revealed that she was pregnant, with a gestational age of approximately two and a half months.
On the basis of these facts, FIR No. 696/2023 was registered on 19 July 2023 for offences under the Indian Penal Code, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. By the time the quashing petition came up for consideration before the Court, Respondent No. 2 had attained majority and appeared in Court along with her infant child, who was born on 26 January 2024.
The Court interacted with her at length and recorded that she affirmed voluntary cohabitation with Petitioner No. 1, denied any coercion or abuse, and reiterated her desire that the criminal proceedings be brought to an end.
The Human Dilemma Before the Court
The Court candidly acknowledged the emotional complexity of the case and observed that the presence of the victim with her infant child brought into sharp focus the reality that the criminal proceedings were closely intertwined with the stability of a young family. On a purely human and equitable plane, the Court noted that quashing the FIR appeared to be a compassionate and pragmatic course, particularly when the victim herself did not wish to criminalise the relationship.
However, the Court emphasised that judicial decision-making cannot be guided by instinct or sympathy alone and must remain firmly anchored in the mandate of law.
Why the FIR Could Not Be Quashed
POCSO as a Strict Liability Statute
The Court underscored that the POCSO Act, 2012 leaves no scope for ambiguity. Section 2(1)(d) defines a “child” as any person below the age of 18 years, and the offence-creating provisions under Sections 3 and 7 criminalise specified sexual acts with a child without reference to consent.
Once it is established that the victim was below 18 years of age and that the sexual act occurred, the offence is complete in itself. Unlike Section 375 of the IPC, the POCSO Act does not recognise consent as a legally relevant factor when the victim is a child.
Consent of a Minor Has No Exculpatory Value
Reiterating settled legal principles, the Court held that a child lacks the legal capacity to consent to sexual activity. Apparent willingness or voluntary participation, howsoever genuine it may appear on facts, cannot dilute the criminality of the act. Parliament has consciously fixed the age of consent at 18 years, thereby eliminating any scope for judicial dilution.
The Court made it clear that creating an exception for “near-majority consensual relationships” would amount to judicial legislation, a course constitutionally impermissible.
Statutory Presumptions Under Sections 29 and 30 of POCSO
The Court further relied upon the presumptions incorporated under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. Once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, the Court is mandated to presume the commission of the offence and the existence of the requisite culpable mental state, subject to rebuttal during trial.
At the pre-trial stage, these statutory presumptions significantly constrain the Court’s power to quash proceedings.
Subsequent Events Cannot Legalise Past Illegality
The Court unequivocally held that subsequent developments such as marriage, continued cohabitation, the birth of a child, or the victim’s present stance cannot retrospectively legalise conduct which was criminal at the time it occurred. While equitable considerations may strongly favour the accused, the statute admits no such flexibility.
As the Court succinctly observed, equity may pull in one direction, but the statute pulls harder.
Broader Institutional and Social Concerns
The Court also took note of the fact that the parents of both parties were arraigned under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 for allegedly facilitating or condoning a child marriage. Quashing the FIR in such circumstances, the Court cautioned, would risk sending a dangerous signal that underage marriages and sexual relationships with minors can be sanitised post facto by continued cohabitation or the birth of a child.
The Court emphasised the need to remain cognisant of the possibility that a minor’s apparent consent may be shaped by familial pressure, social stigma, or community expectations, particularly once pregnancy has occurred.
Conclusion
Characterising the matter as a “hard case”, the Court acknowledged that empathy strongly favoured the petitioners but held that statutory mandate must prevail. It found no patent abuse of process, noted that the essential ingredients of the alleged offences were clearly disclosed, and concluded that it could not invoke its inherent or constitutional powers to override legislative intent. Accordingly, the petition seeking quashing of FIR No. 696/2023 was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that in matters of child protection, the command of the statute outweighs even the most compelling equitable considerations.